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The beginning of my story dates back
almost half a century, and can be
viewed in the light of chaos theory you know, the beating of a butterfly
wing in Brazil results in a storm across
the Atlantic. In my case it was the
invasion of the body of a colleague by
a virus that resulted in me, rather than
him, being asked to look after a visitor
from New Zealand. I was much
impressed when he told me that to
become a good social scientist one
ought to learn at first-hand about other
cultures. So two years later I got a job
in West Africa and started doing crosscultural psychology. But like Mr.
Jourdain, who only later discovered
that he was speaking prose, I did not know then that I was doing cross-cultural
psychology, since the term had, as far as I know, not yet been invented.
At the time I was very much the odd man out, regarded as something of an eccentric
by my colleagues back home. In the intervening years more and more people have
become interested, and the area has become relatively respectable. I use the word
"relatively", since mainstream psychology is far from having welcomed us warmly. The
impact varies greatly according to domains, though not in a logically coherent way. For
instance, one would have thought that culture is particularly important for both
developmental and social psychology. In the former this has to a considerable extent been
taken on board, but social psychologists, notably experimental ones, continue with what in
my view are often trivial pursuits. I have tried to show in the past that a substantial
proportion of their findings are unlikely to be more than locally valid, but my challenge was
almost totally ignored.
The reasons for the resistance have probably more to do with institutional vested
interest, conservatism, and practical problems, than with theoretical considerations.
Perhaps rather more disturbing to me is an attack from another quarter, namely Michael
Cole, many of whose views I share, and whom one might have expected to be an ally. Let
me explain. In an excellent book expounding his vision of cultural psychology, Cole (1996)
has a chapter headed "cross-cultural investigations". In it he surveys a sample of three
areas, namely perception, intelligence, and memory. It is a concise and acute summary,
difficult to quarrel with it as regards factual content. However, when it comes to
evaluations, the accent is throughout on shortcomings and limitations.
Beginning with the classic work of Rivers, he writes that "these results are what one
would expect" (Cole, 1996, p. 66). Surely this is true only in hindsight! As far as modern
studies of illusions are concerned, it has been shown that several complex factors are
involved; and if the fact that, as he puts it, "many key issues about causality remain
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problematic" (Cole, 1996, p. 52) is taken as rendering the whole project questionable, then
the same could be said about many fields of research, and not only in psychology.
The second theme dealt with by Cole, namely intelligence, is certainly problematic;
but no more so in cross-cultural than in mainstream psychology. Moreover, it is rather a
peripheral issue for cross-cultural psychology. The third and last theme is that of memory,
to which Cole himself together with his colleagues made important contributions. It must
be admitted that generally cross-cultural research on memory has not been very
impressive, and I shall come back to that. At any rate Cole suggests, in accordance with
cultural activity theory, that cultural differences in remembering arise from variations in
"organization of activity in everyday life". The case for this is convincing, but it is worth
noting that the broad drift of the argument is rather similar to that of Rivers in relation to
perception; while visual acuity is more or less the same in all cultures, exceptional ability to
make use of minimal visual cues is highly context-dependent.
In sum, the contrast between cross-cultural and Cole's cultural psychology is
perhaps rather less sharp than he contends in seeking to demonstrate the superiority of
the latter. He concludes with some harsh words about what he calls the ‘standard crosscultural approach’:
Assuming that my assessment of these three examples more or less
characterizes accomplishments in other psychological domains, the marginality of
cross-cultural research to mainstream psychology is not difficult to understand. Its
substantive offerings appear modest, and the evidence on which they are based
is suspect. (Cole, 1996, p. 68)
In sum, Cole's assessment tends to exaggerate the weaknesses and play down the
achievements; hence it is rather unfair. On the other hand, there are in my opinion no
grounds for complacency. Hence I shall use this opportunity, perhaps inappropriately on
such an occasion, to voice some of my misgivings. However, I am not alone: my views are
in line with some of those expressed by A. C. Paranjpe (1997). My discussion will initially
be focused on the declared objectives of cross-cultural psychology, and I shall suggest
that these are, at least in part, misguided. Its threefold goals, as set out in the important
volume by Berry, Poortinga, Segall and Dasen (1992), may be summarized as follows:
1. Transport and test: investigating the applicability of western hypotheses and theories in
other cultures
2. Exploring cultural variations in psychological functioning;
3. Arriving at universal laws.
As regards the first goal, transport and test, it can hardly be said that a great deal of
progress has been made. This is not just the fault of cross-cultural psychology, and can
also be attributed to the nature of most psychological theories; they are often formulated in
a manner that renders rigorous testing difficult. Moreover, for the mainstream to abandon
or even modify theories, the weight of evidence has to be very substantial, and this is
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usually not feasible given the usually slender resources. Nonetheless, if this were a major
goal, results obtained in that direction ought to be more visible after a quarter-century.
There should be a chapter or at least just a paper, entitled "Western theories crossculturally tested and found wanting"; but I have never come across anything like that.
Before discussing the second goal, let me first jump to the third, distal one, of a universal
psychology based on cross-cultural research. Some of my friends and colleagues believe
that this will soon be within our reach, but I do not share that faith for the following
reasons. First of all, I have not met any clear and convincing explication of the way in
which a universal psychology might be generated. One proposal has been to, as it were
"strip away" culture, which would leave universal human nature. The trouble is that by
doing so one also strips away an essential feature of humanity. For as Geertz (1973)
graphically put it, humans without culture would be mere unworkable monstrosities. The
problem arises from the fact that human behavior is a complex function of both biology and
culture, and the boundaries between the two are uncertain, varying according to domain
and context. Cultures themselves differ not merely geographically, but change over
historical periods, while the time-scale of biological change is vastly greater. Given this
variability, it would seem that a universal psychology would have to rest largely on biology,
as is implicit in much of mainstream theorizing. In other words, in so far as one is
concerned with certain partial aspects of human functioning such as, for instance,
information processing or remembering, universal features will be identifiable. But the
goals of arriving at a universal psychology via cross-cultural psychology, is, in my opinion,
little more than a chimera.
There is, however, an alternative approach adopted by one of the cultural
psychologies. I use the plural, since its several versions take very different positions
regarding universality. What cultural psychologies have in common is the conviction that
methodological behaviorism is unsuitable for the study of culture and mind. Shweder's
version eschews such an aim altogether, concentrating on the need to understand
particular cultures in depth. By contrast, Cole and his associates have sought to cut the
Gordic knot by returning to the notion of culture-in-general as conceptualized by Tylor at
the end of the 19th century. This permits the formulation of a universal cultural theory, at
least for the important developmental domain. Since all humans have culture, one does
not necessarily have to go to exotic places for one's empirical work. The theoretical
emphasis is on common processes rather than cultural variations. The cost of this
approach, as far as theory is concerned, is that one is forced to remain at a high level of
abstraction.
Let me return now to the second goal, namely investigating cultural variations in
psychological functioning. Since this is effectively the major area of cross-cultural
research, the relevant passage in the Berry et al. (1992) text will be considered in more
detail. The stated objective is an exploratory one, designed to discover variations not
present in one's own culture. Two means of achieving this are suggested. One is to keep a
sharp lookout for "novel aspects of behavior". The other could be a by-product of the first
aim: if on testing a Western theory in another cultural setting one fails to obtain the
expected results, one should seek to uncover the factors responsible for that failure.
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Thereby novel and interesting cultural variants might be found. The concrete example
offered to illustrate both the first and second sub-goal concerns learning and memory. As
regards the first, they consider the question whether primacy and recency effects are
universal; if such effects are not found, one should investigate further how lists are
memorized. It might be, for instance, that "individuals may evidence different mnemonic
devices during a memory study". It is noteworthy that there is hardly any further mention of
memory in the volume, and the term does not appear in the index.
It is probably no accident that this kind of illustration was selected, since follow-up
studies are more readily feasible when dealing with cognitive processes than with such
spheres as, say, attitudes, values, personality, or identity. As regards the latter, post-hoc
speculative interpretations are most commonly found. There is thus a gap between
declared aims and aspirations, and what is actually done. Moreover, it seems to me that
the gap has widened over time. This view is based on my impressions, admittedly
superficial, of the kinds of changes that have taken place over the decades. They are
based mainly on trends discernible in the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology (JCCP).
This is no doubt a somewhat biased source, since many investigations are published
elsewhere. Nonetheless, since it is a kind of flagship, its contents are surely not
insignificant.
One thing that becomes apparent is that cross-cultural psychology has become a
healthier activity over the years, and this is not just because more and better antibiotics
have become available. Let me explain: those of us who laboured as pioneers often
worked in remote villages and were thus exposed, in my own case, to such afflictions as
malaria or dysentery. We were in direct contact with people, and thus in a position to
observe "novel aspects of behavior". Here is an example: I encountered a superbly skilled
illiterate basket weaver, and commissioned him to copy a special kind of basket from a
photograph. To my astonishment, the finished product turned out to be totally different
from the picture, which he believed to have followed faithfully. This led on to a series of
studies of 2D visual space perception.
It would seem that this kind of approach has become increasingly rare. In a large
majority of studies there is no direct personal contact between researcher and the people
studied. Hence there is little if any opportunity to observe variations in behavior. Moreover,
we commonly criticize the mainstream for basing their theories on such an
unrepresentative sample of humanity as is constituted by American college students. But
studies reported in the JCCP also predominantly rely on college or to a lesser extent high
school students, ignoring the fact that a substantial part of the world population still has
little or no formal schooling.
The modal style of recent work reported appears to be one of getting together with
colleagues in other countries, usually equated with cultures. Some kinds of questionnaires
or scales are administered, recording differences and similarities. This is of course
something of a caricature, but only in the sense of an exaggeration of characteristic
features.
Let me hasten to add that it is of course perfectly legitimate to employ such an
approach as part of a coherent research program; but more usually that is not the case. Or
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again, one popular exercise consists of attempts to find out whether a particular measure
works across cultures, but going no further. One is reminded of Kuhn's (1962) remark that:
"In the absence of a paradigm ... all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the
development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant. As a result, early factgathering is a far more nearly random activity than the one that subsequent scientific
development makes familiar" (p. 15).
There appears to have been a return to what, if I remember rightly, John Berry once
called the "anecdotal" approach, which is purely descriptive of "interesting" differences.
There is unlimited scope for such exercises, especially if one ignores the warning issued
by Campbell and Naroll about the problems of interpreting comparisons between two
natural groups. The chances are that any such comparisons will throw up differences, for a
wide variety of reasons. More important and instructive would be the discovery of
invariances as attempted by Ype Poortinga. In sum, the question arises whether the
previously mentioned efforts are really worth while, if their product is not cumulative and
fails to contribute to the building up a coherent body of knowledge. Perhaps in our postcolonial and rapidly changing world this would be too much to expect. Nevertheless, we
should not shy away from asking ourselves critical questions about fundamental issues.
Although I have taken advantage of this forum to voice some of my misgivings, I
would not wish to leave you with the impression that my general attitude is negative. After
all, I have spent a good part of my life in cross-cultural psychology, and would like to see it
continue to flourish. Nor would I want to gainsay the solid achievements reflected in the
three volumes of the new edition of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Berry et
al., 1997). But we should not rest on our laurels.
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